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In Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s models of procedural choice in legislatures, a committee exerts costly
e⁄ort to acquire private information about an unknown state of the world. Subsequent work on
expertise, delegation, and lobbying has largely followed this approach. In contrast, we develop a
model of information as policy valence. We use our model to analyze a procedural choice game,
focusing on the e⁄ect of transferability, i.e., the extent to which information acquired to imple-
ment one policy option can be used to implement a di⁄erent policy option. We ￿nd that when
information is transferable, as in Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s models, closed rules can induce committee
specialization. However, when information is policy-speci￿c, open rules are actually superior for
inducing specialization. The reason for this surprising result is that a committee lacking formal
agenda power has a greater incentive to exercise informal agenda power by exerting costly e⁄ort to
generate high-valence legislation.The formal study of legislative organization was revolutionized in a series of papers by Gilligan
and Krehbiel, starting with their classic 1987 paper on procedural choice. In a sharp break from
the previously-prevailing norm in the literature, in which committees were modeled as a means
for distributing particularistic legislative spoils, Gilligan and Krehbiel developed models in which
the congressional committee system is primarily a division-of-labor arrangement facilitating the
production of high-quality legislation. In the models, committees are delegated the task of acquiring
policy expertise for a parent chamber that cares about both ideological policy outcomes and the
production of good public policy (Fenno 1973).
Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s models feature a hold up problem based on Crawford and Sobel￿ s (1982)
canonical analysis of cheap talk. A committee can invest in a costly public good ￿information ￿
that enhances the quality of its recommended legislation. However, once produced, information can
be expropriated by other legislators to achieve their own, potentially quite di⁄erent, policy goals.
By committing in advance to consider the legislation under a rule restricting amendments, the ￿ oor
can enhance the committee￿ s incentive to invest in information acquisition.
The Gilligan and Krehbiel models are based on a powerful but narrow notion of the common
good in policy making. In the models, legislators are uncertain about the link between policies
and outcomes, and committees can acquire information about that link. When legislators are risk
averse, uncertainty reduction acts as a common good ￿that is conceptually and mathematically
distinct from distributive consequences...￿(Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990, p. 536). In a vast body
of subsequent literature, uncertainty reduction, expertise, and the common good have become es-
sentially synonymous, regardless of whether the empirical domain is institutional design, lobbying,
or delegation.1 However, for analytical tractability, most models in this tradition rely on assump-
1High pro￿le examples from the literatures on lobbying and legislative politics include Austen-Smith (1990),
Baron (2000), and Battaglini (2000). Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) review and critique delegation models.
1tions about nature of uncertainty and expertise that, as noted by Callander (2008), are technically
restrictive, substantively non-trivial, and ill-suited to some forms of policy expertise.
With these issues in mind, we propose a valence-based model of good public policy, and analyze
committee specialization as the production of policy valence. The concept of valence has been used
primarily in electoral models as a reduced-form representation of candidate-speci￿c characteristics,
such as charisma or competence, that appeal to all voters.2 In our legislative model, valence
serves as a reduced-form representation of publicly observable information generated by legislative
committees about how to achieve universally desirable policy goals such as e⁄ectiveness, e¢ ciency,
or cost reduction.
Our modeling choice is motivated by the observation that congressional committees, their sta⁄,
and lobbyists exert considerable e⁄ort to craft complex legislation that must meet a number of
non-spatial criteria to be successful. Among other things, policies must be coherently-designed,
appropriate to local circumstances, cost-e⁄ective, and practical to implement given the resources
and constraints of a sprawling federal bureaucracy. These considerations, which are not spatial in
nature, naturally suggest a simple model of policy valence.
The two models most similar to ours are by Londregan (2000) and Ting (2010). Londregan
analyzes the institutional implications of policy valence in Chile, and shows that the ability to gen-
erate high-valence policies gives the President informal agenda power, because when the President
crafts a high-valence bill the only way the legislature can enjoy the valence bene￿ts is to adopt the
President￿ s proposal. Ting focuses on bureaucratic agencies￿capacity for policy implementation,
analyzing a two-period principal agent model of noncontractable investment under the threat of
second-period policy changes. Although organizational capacity is not a pure valence dimension, it
2See Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), and Aragones and Palfrey (2002). Endogenous valence
electoral models include Caillaud and Tirole (2002), Meirowitz and Tucker (2007), and Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita (2009).
2is valued by both the principal and the agent. A key innovation of Ting￿ s model is that he draws
a distinction between capacity that is specialized, i.e., targeted toward one speci￿c type of policy,
versus general, i.e., applicable across a wide range of policies. When investment is specialized, the
agent may acquire de-facto agenda power by investing in capacity to implement his favored policy.
In contrast to Londregan and Ting, we focus on intra-legislative procedural choice. We apply
and extend their insights in the legislative context by analyzing di⁄erent forms of valence, endo-
genizing its production, and, most importantly, by analyzing how informal valence-based agenda
power interacts with formal agenda power, i.e., legislative rules. We focus in particular on the
degree to which the publicly-available information or valence generated by committees about how
to e⁄ectively design one particular policy can be applied to design alternative policies dealing with
the same issue area. We term this phenomenon information transferability.
At one extreme, legislative committees can generate expertise that is applicable to a wide range
of policies dealing with the same issue area, i.e., valence is transferable. One example of transferable
valence comes from the recent health care reform process: a key contribution of the bipartisan ￿Gang
of Six￿negotiating in the Senate Finance Committee was to design e¢ ciency-increasing changes to
the Medicare reimbursements system.3 The resulting information about how to achieve cost savings
could have been used to help ￿nance liberal or moderate health care reforms, or even conservative
ones. A key feature of transferable valence is that when a committee exerts e⁄ort to craft high
quality legislation, it must consider the possibility that a parent chamber with di⁄erent ideological
objectives can expropriate this investment to achieve di⁄erent policy goals.
At the other extreme, a committee can generate expertise that is only applicable to one par-
ticular policy option that the committee has worked on, i.e., valence is policy-speci￿c or nontrans-
ferable.4 For example, during the health care reform process the Senate Committee on Health,
3￿Medicare system overhaul proposed by two senators,￿New York Times, April 30, 2009.
4Our distinction between transferable and policy-speci￿c valence parallels similar distinctions made by Callander
3Education, Labor, and Pensions generated information about how to design an e⁄ective public
health insurance plan.5 This information could only be applied to legislation that actually included
a public plan ￿it was not transferable to more moderate reforms. A key feature of policy-speci￿c
valence is that when a committee expends costly e⁄ort to craft high quality legislation, it does
not need to worry about the ￿ oor expropriating its investment to improve the quality of some
alternative policy option with a di⁄erent ideological orientation.
To analyze how transferability a⁄ects procedural choice in legislatures, we borrow the Gilli-
gan and Krehbiel (1987) model, but dispense with private information about the link between
policy choices and spatial outcomes. We ￿rst show that when valence is transferable, our model
generates results analogous to the canonical model: to induce committee specialization, a parent
chamber will sometimes commit to consider legislation under a closed rule. However, when valence
is policy-speci￿c our results di⁄er dramatically. Policy-speci￿c valence is inherently protected from
expropriation regardless of the rule, and we show that closed rules actually reduce the committee￿ s
incentive to specialize. Consequently, closed rules are never optimal for the parent chamber.
The reason for this surprising result is that the committee can use policy-speci￿c valence to exert
informal agenda power and pull the policy outcome towards its ideological ideal point. Speci￿cally,
if the committee proposes a bill with a high level of policy-speci￿c valence, then even under an
open rule the ￿ oor may choose not to alter the ideological location of the bill because doing so
would result in a lower-valence policy. In our model, restrictive rules and specialization are thus
substitutable means for the committee to achieve the same end, and we show that the greater is the
committee￿ s formal agenda power via legislative rules, the less incentive it has to obtain informal
agenda power by producing policy-speci￿c valence.
Our results suggest that the ability to induce committee specialization with restrictive rules in
(2008) and Ting (2010) in their work on delegation.
5￿Health care vote illustrates partisan divide," New York Times, July 16, 2009.
4the canonical model is closely tied to the transferability of information. We also extend our model
to show that the parent chamber may want to appoint a committee consisting of preference outliers
who place a high value on informal agenda power and are therefore more willing to specialize.
Finally, at a broader level our analysis points out the need to reconsider the nature of policy and
information in political contexts.
Information Expropriability
To illustrate the rationale behind our model of committee expertise, we ￿rst revisit the canonical
informational model that was developed by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and applied by Gilligan and
Krehbiel. In that framework, players are assumed to be uncertain about the link between a policy
p and the resulting outcome x. A player￿ s preferences ui (x) are based only on the outcome, x; so
policies serve as potentially-imperfect instruments for achieving outcomes.
The canonical model assumes without loss of generality that the mapping between policies
and outcomes is a function that is determined by some unknown state of the world !, where
x = f (p;!). With considerable loss of generality, but considerable gain in analytical tractability,
the model further assumes that ! is simply a number that acts as a common additive shock across
policies, i.e., x = p + ! = f (p;!). Expertise is thus equivalent to learning the value of !.
While this restrictive setup facilitates analysis, it has the peculiar feature that information is
fully invertible (Callander 2008), i.e., knowledge of the outcome x0 resulting from a particular policy
p0 enables an actor to know what outcome x00 will result from any other policy p00. The value of !
encodes all relevant knowledge of the complete mapping between policies and outcomes.
What sort of policy decision corresponds to such a model? Consider the US Congress setting
the defense budget at the height of the Cold War, under uncertainty about Soviet capabilities. As
an approximation, assume that members of Congress are either hawks or doves. Hawks believe that
5overwhelming military superiority is necessary to maintain security, while doves believe that parity
is su¢ cient. In this example, which is inspired by Krehbiel￿ s (1991, pp. 82-3) discussion of defense
spending, a single piece of unknown information ￿the magnitude of Soviet capabilities ￿determines
a legislator￿ s preferences over all possible defense budgets, because legislator preferences are over
the force gap between the countries, rather than the absolute size of the budget. If a hawkish
committee under the direction of a dovish ￿ oor learns the true magnitude of Soviet capabilities,
it wants to mislead the ￿ oor into believing that the force gap is enormous. The information is
expropriable in the sense that, regardless of the actual level of Soviet capabilities, if the ￿ oor learns
the true level it can use this knowledge to implement its dovish policy of parity.
The canonical model is natural for certain policy areas, e.g., those in which the appropriate
scale of the government￿ s response is increasing in the magnitude of a problem. For example, when
Congress decided what size of ￿scal stimulus to adopt in 2009, members were uncertain about the
severity of the recession, and the worse the recession the larger would be each member￿ s most-
preferred stimulus package. However, the x = p + ! model is ill-suited to many other forms of
information, particularly those pertaining to e¢ ciency or to coordination of various components
of a complex policy. In fact, many of Krehbiel￿ s (1991) examples of information and expertise are
better described by a model of information as policy-speci￿c valence:
￿ Debates over whether the Strategic Defense Initiative would work (pp. 62-3): a cost-e⁄ective,
functional missile shield is a high-valence policy, i.e., everyone, even doves, would prefer it
over a costly missile shield that doesn￿ t work.
￿ Reforms of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (pp. 63-4): these reforms
proved to be low-valence, i.e., bad from the perspective of both liberals and conservatives,
because they harmed tenants￿health and safety while costing taxpayers millions of dollars.
6￿ Reforms to improve the functioning of the federal student loan system (pp. 85-6): these
reforms were high-valence, i.e., good from the perspective of politicians across the political
spectrum, because they kept the system a￿ oat, so that honest students could receive loans
and taxpayers would not have to bail out lenders.
￿ A badly-designed, i.e., low-valence, insurance program for catastrophic medical care for the
elderly (p. 93).
It is also worth noting that in many issue areas, information needed to successfully implement
one policy option is not readily transferable to other policies on the same issue. For example,
consider a government provided health plan. If a legislator learns how to design a public option
that holds down costs by minimizing adverse selection, this information is not useful to a leg-
islator designing a single payer system in which adverse selection is irrelevant. And it surely is
useless to a libertarian working to design a fully privatized market. Nonetheless, conditional on
providing a public option everyone would prefer a well-designed policy that holds down costs rather
than a poorly-designed one. Hence, a model of policy-speci￿c valence is appropriate for studying
information in this empirical domain.
Before we turn to our analysis of legislative procedures, we note that a model of policy-speci￿c
valence is a natural way to study how expertise a⁄ects multiple aspects of policy-making. For
example, variation in legislators￿participation on di⁄erent issues (Hall 1996) may be explained
by variation in their desire to exert informal agenda power via the production of policy-speci￿c
valence. Similarly, our model may explain why think tanks and interest groups often present highly
detailed policy recommendations, including speci￿c wording for legislation: although it is possible
to interpret their actions as equilibrium signaling behavior in a cheap-talk game, their goal may well
be simply to publicize well-designed, high-valence policies that promote their ideological objectives.
7The Model
We develop a four-stage sequential game, played by a committee and ￿ oor in a legislature, using
a sequence paralleling Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987). First, the ￿ oor commits to consider the
committee￿ s bill under a closed rule or an open rule. Under a closed rule, the committee￿ s bill is
voted on, up or down, against an exogenous status quo whereas under an open rule, the ￿ oor may
o⁄er amendments and adopt whatever policy best promotes its interests. Second, the committee
chooses whether to invest in valence production and, in the case of policy-speci￿c valence, chooses
a target policy on which to invest. Third, the outcome of the committee￿ s investment is publicly
revealed, and the committee refers a bill to the ￿ oor for consideration. Fourth, the ￿ oor chooses
policy under the rule that it committed to in the ￿rst stage.6
Policy in our model has two components: the ideological location and the valence, or quality,
associated with the bill. Valence is valued by all players, and is simply a number v 2 [0;1); whereas
ideology is a point x 2 R: Thus, each bill is a point in two-dimensional real space b = (v;x) 2 R2.
Players￿utility over the two dimensions is additive, with
Ui (b) = v ￿ ￿i (jxi ￿ xj):
For each player i 2 ff;cg; ￿i (￿) is a spatial loss function de￿ned over [0;1), capturing the utility
loss arising from movements away from a player￿ s preferred ideological policy xi. We assume that
the loss functions are strictly increasing, strictly convex, twice di⁄erentiable, and that ￿i (0) =
￿0
i (0) = 0. Note that quadratic preferences are a special case of our setup, with ￿i (d) = d2.
Without loss of generality we assume the ￿ oor median￿ s ideal point is xf = 0 and the committee￿ s
6The Gilligan and Krehbiel model sequence does not re￿ ect the usual sequence of events in Congress, where
rules are granted after committees design bills. Although Diermeier (1995) provides a justi￿cation for procedural
commitment, it is reasonable to criticize this assumption. However, our most interesting results do not depend on
this assumption, because with policy-speci￿c valence the ￿ oor does not commit to a closed rule, even if it can do so.
8ideal point is xc > 0. We also assume that the status quo policy q has valence 0.7
Because utility from valence is linear and additive, our setup precludes interactions between
ideology and valence. For example, we cannot accommodate the notion that a liberal legislator
prefers that a conservative policy be low-quality because she hopes it will produce bad e⁄ects and
later be altered to a more ideologically-appealing policy. As in other valence models, valence is
by de￿nition valued by everyone. The meaning of valence depends on the particular context. For
example, it may represent cost savings that do not a⁄ect the ideological outcome of a policy; it also
could represent any other non-ideological Pareto improvement in the quality of a policy.8
As in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), only the committee has the ability to engage in costly
investment. However, the product of that investment is valence rather than knowledge of an
unknown state of the world !. Our model contains no private information, and the committee￿ s
investment decision is publicly observable. The valence return is ex-ante uncertain to both the
committee and the ￿ oor, and once revealed is public information.
The valence production process is as follows. First, the committee selects the target policy
~ x 2 R. In the case of policy-speci￿c valence, any information the committee subsequently acquires
will be tailored toward implementing ~ x. Next, the committee decides whether to invest in costly
specialization. If the committee does not invest, the valence of the target policy is 0. If it invests,
the committee pays an up front ￿xed cost c and receives a probabilistic valence return ~ v from a
distribution F (￿) with density f (￿). For simplicity we assume f (￿) is continuous, with full support
restricted to [0;+1), a ￿nite expectation E [v] < 1, and a nondecreasing hazard rate
f(￿)
1￿F(￿). The
last assumption is satis￿ed by many standard distributions, such as the exponential, and is only a
7The Supplemental Appendix shows that our substantive results hold if the status quo has valence vq > 0.
8Valence could also be interpreted as reduction in variance in a purely spatial model with quadratic preferences.
Transferable valence would be a shock reduction that applies to any policy, whereas policy-speci￿c valence would be
a shock reduction that applies only to one speci￿c policy ~ x. We thank an anonymous referee for this observation.
9su¢ cient, not necessary, condition for our results.
Once the committee observes the valence realization ~ v, it can revisit its choice of policy before
referring a bill to the ￿ oor. However, the consequences of bill revision depend on the transferability
of valence, which is exogenous. We model two alternative forms of valence. In the ￿rst, valence
generated in committee can be applied to all policies. Hence, it is transferable, and if the committee
rewrites (or the ￿ oor amends) the bill to implement an alternative spatial policy x0 6= ~ x it retains ~ v.
The nature of valence in the transferable game is analogous to the p + ! model, where knowledge
of ! enables a decision maker to implement any desired outcome. The second form of valence is
policy-speci￿c, i.e., the return generated by the committee￿ s investment is tailored exclusively to the
target policy. The valence ~ v cannot be transferred to other policies, and if the committee rewrites
the bill to implement x0 6= ~ x; the resulting bill has zero valence.
Under an open rule and absent the opportunity for valence production, the unique equilibrium
outcome is simply the ￿ oor￿ s ideal point. Under a closed rule, the outcome depends on the location
of the status quo policy q. We consider the case where 0 < q ￿ xc, i.e., the status quo is in the
Pareto set between the committee and the ￿ oor. The unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(henceforth, ￿equilibrium￿ ) outcome that prevails in the Romer and Rosenthal (1979) closed rule
agenda setter model absent valence is simply gridlock.9
Preview of Results
For each variant of our model ￿transferable and policy-speci￿c valence ￿we characterize equilibrium
policy outcomes, committee investment decisions, and ￿ oor rule choices. Equilibria are unique up
9The case ￿xc < q ￿ 0 < xc is identical, because the committee￿ s most-preferred policy among those that it can
enact under a closed rule is ￿q; which is between 0 and xc: Similarly, standard agenda setting models imply that the
cases where 0 < xc < q or q ￿ ￿xc < 0 < xc; are identical to the case of q = xc.
10to these characteristics, and are solved by backward induction. We specify and compare policy
outcomes in four cases: valence is either transferable or policy-speci￿c, and the rule can be either
open or closed. Here we give a brief overview of our results.
Both the ￿ oor￿ s rule choice and the up-front cost of valence investment in￿ uence the committee￿ s
incentive to invest in valence production. Our ￿rst key result is that when valence is transferable,
the committee￿ s incentive to invest under a closed rule is greater than under an open rule. In the
canonical model, this e⁄ect arises because the protection a⁄orded by closed rules results in more
e¢ cient information transmission. In our model, the transferability of valence makes a closed rule
necessary for the committee to exert informal agenda power using high-valence policies, because
under an open rule the ￿ oor simply expropriates any valence generated in committee and attaches
it to its most preferred ideological policy.
For intermediate costs of specialization, a closed rule is necessary and su¢ cient to induce com-
mittee investment. This property is a key part of the standard informational rationale for closed
rules, because closed rules result in non-centrist ideological outcomes. Due to this property, equilib-
rium behavior in the transferable valence variant of our model is similar to Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s
(1987) results, as seen in the top half of Table 1.10
When the cost of investment is intermediate and the ￿ oor￿ s choice of rule a⁄ects the committee￿ s
investment decision, the ￿ oor selects a closed rule only if the valence gains are su¢ ciently attractive
and the committee is su¢ ciently moderate. This pattern arises because extreme committees use
formal agenda power more aggressively, resulting in greater ideological losses for the ￿ oor. We
show in Proposition 1 how the ￿ oor weighs valence bene￿ts against ideological costs when deciding
whether to adopt a closed rule.
10Krishna and Morgan (2005) characterize a closed-rule equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the one characterized by
Gilligan and Krehbiel. However, as pointed out by Krehbiel (2005), this result of Krishna and Morgan￿ s ￿strengthens
the informational rationale for restrictive rules￿in the x = p + ! model with a single committee.
11When valence is policy-speci￿c, the equilibrium is dramatically di⁄erent. Our key result, Propo-
sition 3, is that a committee￿ s incentive to invest in valence is stronger under an open rule than
under a closed rule. This e⁄ect arises because the committee can use policy-speci￿c valence to
exercise informal agenda power under either rule. For example, under an open rule, if the com-
mittee produces a bill with a high level of policy-speci￿c valence, the ￿ oor may be unwilling to
amend the bill because doing so would result in a loss of the valence bene￿ts from the committee￿ s
investment. Thus a closed rule is no longer necessary to prevent expropriation. In fact, closed rules
and valence are substitutable means for exercising agenda power, and the agenda power conferred
by a closed rule reduces the marginal ideological rents that can be extracted with valence.11 With
policy-speci￿c valence, the ￿ oor always selects an open rule (Proposition 4). This pattern of equi-
librium behavior, summarized in the bottom half of Table 1, stands in stark contrast to both our
transferable valence game and the Gilligan and Krehbiel model.
Notation Before presenting our results we ￿rst introduce some notation. Recall that ￿f (￿) is the
￿ oor￿ s spatial loss function over the ideology dimension. De￿ne ￿ v (x;q) as
￿ v (x;q) = ￿f (jxj) ￿ ￿f (jqj): (1)
So ￿ v (x;q) is the level of valence that makes the ￿ oor indi⁄erent between a bill (￿ v (x;q);x) and
the status quo (0;q). Note that ￿ v (x;q) inherits most of the properties of ￿f (￿); in particular it is
increasing and convex in x.
Let ￿ x(v;q) be implicitly de￿ned as the unique ideological location greater than xf such that:
v = ￿f (j￿ x(v;q)j) ￿ ￿f (jqj) (2)
11The idea that an actor without formal authority can achieve informal authority by learning about consequences
is found in Aghion and Tirole￿ s (1997) analysis of delegation. Our work di⁄ers substantially in that we use a valence-
based modeling technology, and apply our model to legislative procedural choice in a spatial model of policy.
12Given a level of valence v, the ￿ oor is indi⁄erent between a bill (v; ￿ x(v;q)) and (0;q). Hence
(v; ￿ x(v;q)) is the most extreme bill with valence v that the ￿ oor weakly prefers to the status quo.
Clearly ￿ x(v;q) is increasing in v, i.e., the ￿ oor is willing to accept more ideologically extreme bills
the greater is the attached valence.
In each subgame, the committee￿ s investment decision can be characterized by a unique cost
cutpoint such that the committee chooses to invest in valence if and only if c is below this cutpoint.





o (xc) to denote the cutpoints ￿subscripts refer to the rule (closed or open) and superscripts refer
to the type of valence (transferable or non-transferable). In the case of policy-speci￿c valence, to
fully describe the committee￿ s strategy it is also necessary to describe the committee￿ s choice of a
target policy, which we write as ~ xcl (xc;q) and ~ xo (xc) for a closed and open rule, respectively.
Transferable Valence
We ￿rst solve our transferable valence game for the case where the ￿ oor chooses an open rule. We
then solve the closed rule case and determine the ￿ oor￿ s optimal rule choice.
Open Rule The case of transferable valence under an open rule is straightforward. In the ￿nal
stage of the game, regardless of the valence attached, the ￿ oor will amend any bill ^ b referred by
the committee to its own ideal point (xf = 0) along the ideological dimension, because valence is
transferable and amendments are costless. The committee can do nothing to change the outcome
in the ideological dimension, so its incentive to invest is determined only by valence bene￿ts, which
are simply the expected return of the investment E [v]. The cutpoint for the cost of investment is
thus ct
o (xc) = E [v].
In summary, if valence is transferable, then under an open rule committee behavior and policy
13outcomes are as follows. (1) The committee invests if and only if the cost of investing is su¢ ciently
low, i.e., c ￿ ct
o (xc) = E [v]. (2) If the committee does not invest, the policy outcome is (0;0). (3)
If the committee invests and the investment returns valence ~ v, the policy outcome is (~ v;0).
Closed Rule Under a closed rule with transferable valence, our model is a straightforward variant
of a Romer-Rosenthal agenda-setter game. In the ￿nal stage, the committee has referred a bill
^ b = (^ v; ^ x) and the ￿ oor accepts the bill if and only if ^ v ￿ ￿ v (^ x;q), the valence cuto⁄ from Equation
1 such that the ￿ oor is at least as well o⁄ as under the status quo.
We now focus on the penultimate stage. Under an open rule, valence transferability allowed the
￿ oor to expropriate any valence generated in committee for its own policy ends, so the committee
could not exert informal agenda power with high-valence policies. In contrast, with the formal
protection of a closed rule, the ability to transfer valence across policies is retained solely by the
committee. Thus, after observing the realized level of valence, the committee can alter the bill￿ s
ideological location to leave the ￿ oor indi⁄erent between the referred bill and the status quo.
Formally, for each realization of valence ~ v; the committee transfers the valence to the best
ideological policy, for itself, that leaves the ￿ oor at least as well o⁄ as with the status quo. If the
realized valence is su¢ ciently high, i.e. ~ v ￿ ￿ v(xc;q), the committee is able to implement its own
ideal point. Otherwise, the farthest it can pull policy, while still getting the ￿ oor￿ s approval, is
￿ x(~ v;q) = ￿￿1
f (￿f(q) + ~ v). The committee￿ s optimal bill is ^ b = (~ v; ^ x), where ^ x ￿ minfxc; ￿ x(~ v;q)g.
The closed rule equilibrium is shown Figure 1, which graphs ideological policy outcomes as a
function of the valence realization. For a low ~ v the committee proposes a policy on the ideological
dimension that traces out the ￿ oor￿ s indi⁄erence curve through the status quo policy (0;q). For
a high realization of valence, the committee proposes its own ideal point xc and the ￿ oor strictly
prefers the committee￿ s proposal over (0;q): The ￿ oor only enjoys the bene￿ts of valence utility
14when valence is su¢ ciently high to sate the committee￿ s desire to extract ideological policy rents.
If the committee invests in valence, its expected utility is E[v]￿
R ￿ v(xc;q)
0 ￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;q))f(v)dv.
If it does not invest, policy is gridlocked at q and its utility is ￿￿c(xc ￿ q). Subtracting the latter
from the former we derive the cost cutpoint determining the incentive to invest:
ct
cl (xc;q) ￿ E[v] +
Z ￿ v(xc;q)
0
(￿c(xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;q))f(v)dv + (1 ￿ F(￿ v(xc;q)))￿c(xc ￿ q): (3)
The ￿rst term in this expression is the value of the valence itself, which is the same as in the
open rule case. The second and third terms represent the ideological bene￿ts that the committee
achieves by using valence as leverage to pull policy towards its own ideal point. It is important
to note that because of this ideological gain, the committee has a greater incentive to invest in
expertise under a closed rule than under an open rule, i.e., ct
cl (xc;q) > ct
o (xc;q) = E [v]:
In summary, if valence is transferable, then under a closed rule committee behavior and policy
outcomes are as follows. (1) The committee invests if and only if the cost of investing is su¢ ciently
low, i.e., c ￿ ct
cl (xc;q): (2) If the committee does not invest, the policy outcome is (0;q): (3) If
the committee invests and the investment returns valence ~ v, the policy outcome is (~ v; ^ x), where
^ x ￿ minfxc; ￿ x(~ v;q)g:
Rule Choice If the ￿ oor￿ s rule choice does not a⁄ect the committee￿ s investment decision, the
￿ oor prefers an open rule because it receives its own ideal point along the ideology dimension and
valence utility at least as high as under a closed rule.
However, as is the case for some parameter values in the Gilligan and Krehbiel model, in our
transferable valence game, for intermediate costs of specialization the committee invests if and only
if it receives a closed rule.12 We now solve for the ￿ oor￿ s optimal rule choice in such cases, i.e.,
12As an aside, note that in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) the ￿ oor may sometimes prefer a restrictive rule even if
the rule choice is not pivotal for the committee￿ s investment decision. However, this requires that the committee￿ s
15when c 2 (ct
o (xc);ct




￿f (q)f (v)dv +
Z 1
￿ v(xc;q)
(v ￿ ￿f (xc))f (v)dv: (4)
Equation 4 has two components. When the valence realization is below ￿ v (xc;q), the ￿ oor enjoys
no valence bene￿ts because the committee extracts them all in the form of ideological policy rents.
The ￿ oor is forced to accept a policy no better than the status quo, resulting in utility ￿￿f (q).
However, when the valence realization is above ￿ v (xc;q), the committee extracts no additional
ideological rents (it receives its own ideal point and is sated) and the ￿ oor enjoys the extra bene￿ts
of valence, i.e., v￿￿f (xc) is strictly greater than ￿￿f (q). Because the ￿ oor￿ s utility under an open
rule absent investment is simply 0, the ￿ oor prefers a closed rule with investment to an open rule
with no investment if and only if Equation 4 is positive.
When the committee￿ s ideal point is exactly at the status quo xc = q, Equation 4 equals
E [v] ￿ ￿f (q), the expected value of the valence return minus the ￿ oor￿ s utility loss of accepting
the non-centrist status quo point q. Also, Equation 4 is strictly decreasing in xc and approaches
￿￿f (q) < 0 as xc ! 1 (Lemma 3 in the Appendix). Intuitively these properties are obvious;
a more extreme committee is less easily sated, so under a closed rule it leaves the ￿ oor with less
surplus valence utility. In the limit, an in￿nitely extreme committee extracts all valence bene￿ts
in the form of ideological policy rents, leaving the ￿ oor no better o⁄ than with the status quo.
Thus, the ￿ oor￿ s equilibrium rule choices are straightforward. If the status quo q is su¢ ciently
extreme, i.e. ￿f (q) ￿ E [v], then regardless of the committee￿ s ideal point the value of valence
is insu¢ cient to overcome the ideological loss resulting from a closed rule. Alternatively, if q is
relatively moderate, i.e. ￿f (q) < E [v], there is an upper bound on the committee￿ s ideal point
preferences be closely aligned with the ￿ oor. In that model the closed rule not only provides the committee with
ideological rents, but is more informationally e¢ cient, i.e., the value of the collective bene￿t itself is greater under
the closed rule. This feature does not extend to our model.
16￿ xc (q) > q such that the ￿ oor would ￿nd it worthwhile to grant a closed rule in order to induce
specialization. Combining these observations, we now characterize the ￿ oor￿ s optimal rule choice
as a function of the committee￿ s ideal point xc and the cost of investment, c. These equilibrium
rule choices are shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 1 With transferable valence, the ￿oor strictly prefers a closed rule to an open rule if
and only if both of the following conditions hold.








2. The valence bene￿t to the ￿oor exceeds the ideological loss from the closed rule, i.e.,
R 1
￿ v(xc;q) (v ￿ ￿f (xc))f (v)dv ￿
R ￿ v(xc;q)
0 ￿f (q)f (v)dv. This may equivalently be written as,
a. q < q￿, where q￿ solves ￿f (q￿) = E [v].
b. xc 2 (q; ￿ xc (q)), where ￿ xc (q) solves
￿
Z ￿ v(￿ xc(q);q)
0
￿f (q)f (v)dv +
Z 1
￿ v(￿ xc(q);q)
(v ￿ ￿f (￿ xc (q)))f (v)dv = 0
Overall, the results in this section closely parallel the results in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987),
despite the fact that we use a very di⁄erent model of information. In both models, specialization
is bene￿cial to both the ￿ oor and the committee. If the cost of investment is low, the committee
always specializes regardless of the ￿ oor￿ s rule choice. On the other hand, if the cost is high the
committee never invests. For intermediate cost levels, the committee￿ s decision about whether to
specialize depends on the rule under which its bill will be considered.
However, as we show below, when valence is policy-speci￿c, the nature of the equilibrium is
dramatically di⁄erent. This indicates that the threat of expropriation is a key factor driving the
canonical results.
17Policy-Speci￿c Valence
We now analyze the case of policy-speci￿c valence. In the transferable valence game, we did not
characterize the committee￿ s initial choice of a target policy ~ x because valence generated by the
committee￿ s investment could be freely transferred across policies. With policy-speci￿c valence,
however, the valence returned by the committee￿ s investment ~ v is attached solely to the target
policy, and if either the committee or the ￿ oor chooses to alter the ideology of the bill, the fruits
of the committee￿ s investment are lost.
The committee￿ s choice of a target policy is therefore a critical component of its strategy. If
it works on an extreme policy, its bill will only be enacted by the ￿ oor if a high valence return is
realized, which occurs with low probability. However, if the committee chooses a moderate target
policy, it potentially foregoes ideological rents, because for high valence returns the ￿ oor would be
willing to enact a more extreme policy. We now characterize the committee￿ s investment decisions,
including its choice of a target policy. The committee￿ s equilibrium behavior under an open rule
can be treated as a special case of the closed rule, which we therefore analyze ￿rst.
Closed Rule The ￿nal stage (￿ oor vote) under a closed rule is identical to the transferable
valence case. In the penultimate stage (committee proposal), note that for any valence realization
~ v the committee has no incentive to amend its bill ^ b from the target policy ~ x. Any alternative
bill preferred by the committee will have 0 valence because valence is non-transferable. Because
q 2 (0;xc) such bills fail against the status quo. In contrast to our transferable valence model, with
policy-speci￿c valence the committee has no incentive to alter the bill after observing the valence
realization, so the set of equilibrium ideological policy outcomes is binary. Either the status quo
prevails (if v < ￿ v (~ x;q)), or the target policy ~ x prevails (if v ￿ ￿ v (~ x;q)).
Proceeding backward to the investment decision and selection of the target policy, suppose that
18the committee has chosen to invest. The optimal target policy maximizes the committee￿ s expected
utility conditional on investment. Clearly the committee will not select a target policy ~ x < q or
~ x > xc because it would be better o⁄ working on either q or xc. We denote the optimal target
policy as ~ xcl (xc;q), which is
~ xcl (xc;q) = argmax
~ x2[q;xc]
(







The ￿rst term of the maximand is the committee￿ s ideological loss when the valence ~ v is insu¢ cient
to beat the status quo, which occurs with probability F (￿ v (~ x;q)). The second term is the ideological
loss when ~ v is su¢ cient to pass the target policy ~ x, which is better for the committee than the
status quo, but weakly worse than its own ideal point xc. The third term is the committee￿ s utility
from valence. Note that this equals (1 ￿ F (￿ v (~ x;q))) ￿ E [vjv ￿ ￿ v (~ x;q)], the probability that the
target policy passes times the expected value of valence conditional on passage. This is strictly less
than E [v] because valence is lost when the ￿ oor chooses to maintain the status quo.
We now state our ￿rst result for the case of policy-speci￿c valence, which characterizes the
optimal target policy ~ xcl (xc;q) under a closed rule. The Appendix has the proof of this result, as
well as others not proved in the main text.
Lemma 1 When valence is policy-speci￿c, if the committee chooses to invest its optimal closed
rule target policy ~ xcl (xc;q) is unique, strictly interior to [q;xc], and strictly increasing in q.
We now turn to the committee￿ s equilibrium investment decision. When the committee chooses
not to invest the status quo prevails, and its utility is ￿￿c (xc ￿ q). When it invests, its expected
utility is the maximum of Equation 5. To derive the cost cutpoint for investment, cnt
cl (xc;q); we










￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c
￿







In summary, if valence is policy-speci￿c, then under a closed rule committee behavior and policy
outcomes are as follows. (1) The committee invests if and only if the cost of investing is su¢ ciently
low, i.e., c ￿ cnt
cl (xc;q): (2) If the committee does not invest, the policy outcome is (0;q): (3) If
the committee invests and the investment returns valence ~ v, the policy outcome is
￿
~ v; ~ xcl (xc;q)
￿
if





Open Rule We now characterize the committee￿ s investment behavior under an open rule. To
simplify the analysis, we ￿rst show that in the policy-speci￿c valence game the open rule subgame
can be solved as a special case of the closed rule subgame with q = 0, because both subgames result
in the same policy outcome after every possible bill referral by the committee.
Lemma 2 If valence is policy-speci￿c, then equilibrium expected payo⁄s for every investment de-
cision and choice of target policy by the committee are identical between an open rule subgame and
a closed rule subgame with q = 0.
Applying the lemma, we can substitute q = 0 into the closed rule results to derive the commit-
tee￿ s investment behavior under an open rule. Recall that the optimal open rule target policy is
~ xo (xc). For simplicity, we write the valence cuto⁄ ￿ v (x;0) as ￿ v (x) = ￿f (x). Following Equation 5,
~ xo (xc) = argmax
x2[0;xc]
(






We now state a corollary to Lemma 1 for the open rule case, and compare the closed and open rule
target policies.
20Proposition 2 With policy-speci￿c valence, if the committee chooses to invest under an open
rule, its optimal target policy ~ xo (xc) is unique and strictly interior to [0;xc]. Moreover, ~ xo (xc)
< ~ xcl (xc;q) for all q > 0.
Proof: The ￿rst statement follows trivially from the fact that ~ xo (xc) = ~ xcl (xc;0), while the second
follows from the fact that ~ xcl (xc;q) is strictly increasing in q, as shown in Lemma 1. ￿
Intuitively we would expect the target policy under an open rule to be more moderate than
that under a closed rule; the proposition demonstrates formally that this holds for any status quo
point q > 0. Later, we will show that this is one factor that ensures that the ￿ oor prefers an open
rule when valence is policy-speci￿c.
Finally, as in the closed rule case we subtract o⁄ ￿￿c (xc), the committee￿ s utility if it chooses
not to invest and the ￿ oor passes its own ideal point, from the maximum of Equation 7 and derive
the open rule cost cutpoint cnt
o (xc) for committee investment:
cnt




In summary, if valence is policy-speci￿c, then under a closed rule committee behavior and policy
outcomes are as follows. (1) The committee invests if and only if the cost is su¢ ciently low, i.e.,
c ￿ cnt
o (xc). (2) If the committee does not invest, the policy outcome is (0;0): (3) If the committee
does invest and the investment returns valence ~ v, the policy outcome is (~ v; ~ xo (xc)) if ~ v ￿ ￿ v (~ xo (xc))
and (0;0) otherwise.
Rule Choice The rule chosen by the ￿ oor depends on two factors: the policy outcomes that
prevail and the committee￿ s incentive to invest under each type of rule. In the transferable valence
game, the ￿ oor sometimes faced a trade-o⁄ in which it had to adopt a closed rule and sacri￿ce
ideological rents to give the committee su¢ cient incentives to invest. For policy-speci￿c valence, no
21such trade-o⁄ exists. We prove that open rules not only generate more moderate policy outcomes
(Proposition 2), but also create greater incentives for the committee to invest.
Proposition 3 If valence is policy-speci￿c, then cnt
cl (xc;q) < cnt







, the committee will invest under an open rule, but not under a closed rule.
Why do the bene￿cial incentive e⁄ects of closed rules vanish? When valence is policy-speci￿c,
a high valence return makes the committee￿ s chosen target policy more attractive to the ￿ oor, but
has no e⁄ect on the quality of the other available policy alternatives. As a result, the committee
retains the ability to exert informal agenda power absent formal procedural rights. Regardless of
the rule, the ￿ oor must accept the committee￿ s target policy to enjoy the fruits of its valence return.
This severs the link between restrictive rules and valence-driven agenda power, and they become
substitutable means for achieving the same end.
Mathematically, a closed rule allows the committee to hold policy at the status quo q > 0.
Because utility is concave in the ideological dimension, the committee￿ s ideological bene￿ts from
pulling policy in its direction from q by a ￿xed increment ￿ are smaller than the bene￿ts of pulling
policy away from xf = 0 by that same ￿. Also, when policy begins at q > 0 rather than the ￿ oor￿ s
ideal point, the ￿ oor is less easily persuaded (i.e., needs to see higher valence returns) to agree to
move policy by ￿ toward the committee￿ s ideal point. Consequently, the committee￿ s utility bene￿ts
from exercising informal agenda power with valence are greater under an open rule.
The better incentive properties of the open rule, combined with the more moderate policy
outcomes it generates (Proposition 2) together imply that the ￿ oor has an unconditional preference
for open rules when valence is policy-speci￿c, a striking contrast with Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s results.
Proposition 4 With policy-speci￿c valence, the ￿oor selects an open rule for all values of c, q,
and xc.
22Given our previous results, the formal argument underlying this proposition is almost trivial.
When the cost of investment is either low or high, the ￿ oor￿ s rule decision has no e⁄ect on the
committee￿ s decision to invest, and hence the ￿ oor prefers the more moderate policy produced by
an open rule. When the cost of investment is intermediate, from Proposition 3 we know that the
committee invests in valence only under an open rule. Then under an open rule the outcome is
either the ￿ oor￿ s ideal point xf = 0 with no valence, or a bill (~ v; ~ xo (xc)) that is even better for
the ￿ oor. In either case the ￿ oor is better o⁄ than under a closed rule, which guarantees that it
receives the status quo policy q with no valence.
Application: Committee Composition
Having analyzed rule choice, we brie￿ y analyze committee membership. Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s
prediction that the ￿ oor would choose centrist committees produced much empirical debate (e.g.,
Hall and Grofman 1990, Krehbiel 1991, Londregan and Snyder 1994). In our model, unlike Gilligan
and Krehbiel￿ s work, a ￿ oor may prefer to appoint preference outliers to committees. Although
the ￿ oor would like to have a centrist committee that exerts e⁄ort to produce high quality centrist
legislation, it knows that if the cost of specialization is high a centrist committee will be unwilling
to specialize. In such cases the ￿ oor may choose to appoint outliers who place a higher value on
informal agenda power and thus are more willing to specialize.
The fact that extreme committees place a high value on informal agenda power follows directly
from risk aversion. To see this, suppose that a committee with quadratic preferences and ideal
point xc > 0 faces the choice of accepting the policy outcome 0, or paying a price c > 0 to move

















= ￿px2 + (2px) ￿ xc.
23Note that this expression is increasing in the committee￿ s ideal point, due to concavity of its utility
function. This is the basic reason that a more extreme committee is willing to pay a higher cost to
generate valence that can be used to pull policy towards its ideal point.
To see how the committee￿ s investment incentives a⁄ect the ￿ oor￿ s decision about whether to
appoint a centrist or an outlier committee, we brie￿ y consider the following special case of an
extension to our model.13 Assume that the players have quadratic loss functions ￿f (d) = ￿c (d) =
d2, valence is exponentially distributed with density f (v) = e￿v, and the status quo is q = 1
2.
Suppose that prior to the game the ￿ oor, which has an ideal point at 0; can select the ideal point






. What xc would it choose?
Transferable Valence If valence is transferable, then the ￿ oor only appoints an outlier xc > 0 if
it plans to use a closed rule to induce specialization. By Proposition 1, the committee￿ s preferences
thus cannot be too extreme, i.e. xc ￿ ￿ xc (q). Given our simplifying assumptions, the most extreme
committee to which the ￿ oor is willing to grant a closed rule is ￿ xc (q) =
p
q2 ￿ ln(q2) ￿ 1:28 for
q = 1
2. So in this example, the ￿ oor would be willing to appoint the moderate outlier xc = 3
4 if
necessary to induce specialization, but would never appoint the extreme outlier xc = 3
2.
The optimal appointee depends on the cost of specialization, because as cost increases the
committee must be more extreme to ￿nd specialization worthwhile. If the cost is intermediate, e.g.,
c = 1:04, the ￿ oor optimally appoints the moderate outlier xc = 3
4, because it will specialize but a
centrist committee xc = 0 would not. Alternatively, if the cost of specialization is high, e.g., c = 1:1,
the ￿ oor chooses the centrist committee xc = 0; expecting no specialization to occur. Although the
extreme outlier xc = 3
2 would specialize if granted a closed rule, the resulting distributive costs are
too great for the ￿ oor to be willing to grant a closed rule.
13A complete analysis of the design of committees is in the Supplemental Appendix.
24Policy-Speci￿c Valence If valence is policy-speci￿c, the ￿ oor will always use an open rule and
thus is always better o⁄ appointing an outlier committee that will specialize over a centrist one
that will not. If the ￿ oor appoints an outlier that fails to produce enough valence ~ v on its target
policy ~ xo (xc) to leave the ￿ oor better o⁄ than with its own ideal point xf = 0, the ￿ oor can simply
amend the policy and be no worse o⁄.




and ~ xo ￿3
2
￿
￿ :560. The ￿ oor therefore desires to appoint the most moderate committee willing to
specialize. If the cost of specialization is intermediate, e.g., c = 1:2 > E [v] = 1, the ￿ oor appoints
the moderate outlier xc = 3
4 because both outliers would specialize but the centrist committee
would not. If the cost of specialization is high, e.g., c = 1:5, the ￿ oor must appoint the extreme
outlier xc = 3
2 to ensure specialization.
In summary, the example demonstrates that with either type of valence the ￿ oor may prefer to
have non-centrist committees. The most important implication of this section is that the widely
held intuition (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990, Krehbiel 1991) that models of expertise and information
provision imply a ￿ oor preference for centrist committees is not general; rather, that intuition is
speci￿c to the private-information models used by those authors. In our model, as in previous
informational models, the congressional committee system is designed to produce high quality
legislation. The di⁄erence is that in our model the parent chamber can have an incentive to construct
committees composed of preference outliers.
Robustness
In this section, we discuss how our key results extend to alternative model speci￿cations, starting
with technical features and then considering more substantial changes to our theoretical approach.
At a technical level, the structure of the utility functions for the two players in our model
25can be generalized, because they are constrained neither to weight ideology against valence in a
particular proportion nor to place the same relative weight on valence. Also, our analysis does not
require symmetry on the spatial component of utility functions. More generally, in the transferable
valence game, the results hold for certain types of interactions between ideology and valence,
including arbitrary utility functions Uf (v;x) and Uc (v;x) that are strictly increasing in v for any
x, strictly single peaked in x for any v, and have the same peak xi for any v. In the nontransferable
valence game a su¢ cient condition for our key results is that the utility functions can be written
as Ui (v;x) = gi (v) + hi (x); with gi increasing and hi strictly concave for both players.
More importantly, the key result in our policy-speci￿c valence model does not hinge on the
sharp discontinuity implied by fully policy-speci￿c valence: it can be extended to the case of par-
tially transferable valence, provided that valence is not too transferable. For example, assume a
continuous valence decay function g (~ v;j~ x ￿ xj). In this speci￿cation the level of valence associated
with the target policy ~ x is ~ v, and the function g (￿;￿) speci￿es the amount of valence remaining when
the bill is amended to an alternative policy x.14 The negative incentive e⁄ects from closed rules
remain, provided that g2 (￿;￿), the ￿rst derivative of valence with respect to movements in the ideol-
ogy dimension away from the target policy, is su¢ ciently negative. In fact, when
￿ ￿g2 (￿;￿)
￿ ￿ > ￿0
f (xc),
the result not only remains but the formal analysis is identical. The intuition is straightforward:
if valence is only transferable to policies very close to the initial target policy ~ x, then under an
open rule the ￿ oor makes only very small changes to the committee referral, because the marginal
valence loss quickly exceeds the marginal ideological bene￿t.
Finally, and most importantly, we can use our model to analyze what happens if the commit-
tee, but not the ￿ oor, can transfer valence, so that although valence is transferable it is inherently
14This setup is related to Callander￿ s (2008) Brownian motion model, which formalizes the intuition that actors￿
expected utility declines as policy is shifted away from previously-developed options.
26non-expropriable. Such a setup is natural if expertise in a policy area consists of skill in drafting
legislation that will survive legal challenges and be implemented properly by administrative agen-
cies. Although the polar cases we have analyzed ￿valence transferable by either actor or by neither
actor ￿are appropriate for many issue areas, such as health care reform, there surely are other
policy areas in which valence is transferable by the committee but not by the ￿ oor. Analysis of a
model with this sort of valence yields results similar to the ones we present here for policy-speci￿c
valence: the ￿ oor always chooses open rules, which are more e⁄ective than closed rules in inducing
the committee to invest in expertise. Details can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.
Conclusion
To conclude, we revisit our key contributions, and discuss their implications in greater depth. For
the past two decades, the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model has been so in￿ uential that formal
theorists￿notions of good public policy have been, with very few exceptions, based on uncertainty
reduction in models of incomplete information. Despite the many advances such work has produced,
we believe that it is a mistake for scholars collectively to lock in to a single modeling technology,
particularly given that for many empirical applications a valence-based model is more natural than
the x = p + ! setup.
To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we tackle a question that is largely infeasible in
the standard model ￿the e⁄ect of information transferability on procedural choice. As noted in
the introduction and in our discussion of information expropriability, for many types of policies,
particularly those that require careful coordination of many components of a complicated piece of
legislation, information that is gathered to craft one bill cannot be readily applied to other bills
elsewhere in the ideological spectrum.
When valence is transferable, our results are quite similar to Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987).
27This fact has two implications. At a technical level, Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s results on legislative
procedures are more general than previously understood, because they can be obtained in a model
of information as transferable valence as well as in a model of information as private knowledge of !:
However, at an applied level, many scholars implicitly assume that results from the x = p+! setup
apply to any type of policy-relevant information. This interpretation simply is not correct, because
Gilligan and Krehbiel￿ s results hinge on the fact that a restrictive rule is necessary to prevent the
￿ oor from expropriating the committee￿ s investment. In sharp contrast, in our model with policy-
speci￿c information the committee￿ s investment is protected by the nature of the information itself.
As a result, open rules are superior for inducing committee e⁄ort, because they give the committee a
greater incentive to obtain informal agenda power by crafting a well-designed, high-valence proposal
that the ￿ oor is willing to enact. A comparison of our two models suggests a new testable prediction
for future empirical research: committees are more likely to operate under restrictive rules when
the nature of their expertise is transferable than when it is policy-speci￿c.
Finally, we note that there are many possible theoretical extensions of our framework for study-
ing specialization and expertise. Here we note three possibilities. First, the model could be used
to analyze situations in which legislation can be developed by multiple committees, factions within
a committee, or outside lobbyists. The natural question that arises in such a model is whether
the multiple actors who can engage in policy development will free-ride on each others￿e⁄orts or
engage in an arms race to produce high-valence policies at di⁄erent ideological locations. Second,
as suggested by [[name withheld]], the model could be extended to allow a committee to choose
whether to invest in transferable or policy-speci￿c expertise. Third, the model could be used to
analyze how other features of legislative institutions, such as the ￿libuster, a⁄ect the quality of
policies that are enacted. Ultimately, we hope that others will build upon our model to analyze
other aspects of legislative organization and political processes more generally.
28Appendix
Let V t
cl (q;xc), V t
o (xc), V nt
cl (q;xc), and V nt
o (xc) denote the ￿ oor￿ s equilibrium utility when the
committee invests￿ subscripts refer to the rule (closed or open) and superscripts refer to the type
of valence (transferable or non-transferable). Let V (q;x) be the ￿ oor￿ s utility when the committee






E [v] ￿ ￿f (x) when x 2 [0;q]
R ￿ v(x;q)
0 ￿￿f (q)f (v)dv +
R 1
￿ v(x;q) (v ￿ ￿f (x))f (v)dv when x 2 (q;1)
Lemma 3 V (q;x) has the following properties.
1. The ￿oor￿ s equilibrium utility if the committee invests can be expressed in terms of V (￿); because
V t
cl (q;xc) = V (q;xc), V t
o (xc) = V (0;0) = E [v], V nt
cl (q;xc) = V
￿
q; ~ xcl (q;xc)
￿




0; ~ xcl (0;xc)
￿
.
2. V (q;x) is continuous in q and xc
3. V (q;x) is strictly decreasing in x and limx!1 V (q;x) = ￿￿f (q).
4. V (q;x) is strictly decreasing in q for q 2 [0;x]
Proof. Property 1 is straightforward to verify and 2 follows from continuity of ￿f (￿) and ￿c (￿).
Property 3: First we show strictly decreasing. Clearly the property holds for x ￿ q. Now consider




￿￿f (q)f (v)dv +
Z ￿ v(x0;q)
￿ v(x;q)
(v ￿ ￿f (x))f (v)dv +
Z 1
￿ v(x0;q)








￿￿f (q)f (v)dv +
Z ￿ v(x0;q)
￿ v(x;q)
























f (v)dv > 0:
In the ￿rst term v ￿ ￿f (x) ￿ ￿￿f (q) because v ￿ ￿ v (x;q). In the second term ￿f (x0) > ￿f (x)
because x0 > x.
Now we show limx!1 V (q;x) = ￿￿f (q). Clearly limx!1 V (q;x) ￿ ￿￿f (q) since V (q;x) >
￿￿f (q) 8x. It hence su¢ ces to show limx!1 V (q;x) ￿ ￿￿f (q). Since ￿￿f (x) < 0 we have
lim
x!1V (q;x) ￿ lim
x!1
 Z ￿ v(x;q)
0














by ￿ v (x;q) increasing, convex in x
= ￿￿f (q):

















(￿￿f (q) ￿ (v ￿ ￿f (x)))f (v)dv > 0
since ￿f (q0) > ￿f (q) and v < ￿f (x) ￿ ￿f (q) for v 2 (￿ v (x;q0); ￿ v (x;q)).￿
Proof of Lemma 1 From Eq. 5, the committee￿ s optimal choice satis￿es
~ xcl (xc;q) = argmax
x2[q;xc]
(






Recall ￿ v (x;q) = ￿f (x) ￿ ￿f (q). The derivative of the committee￿ s objective function w.r.t. x is
(1 ￿ F (￿ v (x;q)))
￿
￿H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿ [￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ x) + ￿ v (x;q)] + ￿0
c (xc ￿ x)
￿
; (9)
where H (v) denotes the hazard rate
f(v)
1￿F(v) and @￿ v
@x = ￿0
f (x). To show that the committee￿ s optimal
target policy is unique, strictly interior to [q;xc], and characterized by the ￿rst-order condition, it
30su¢ ces to show that Equation 9, a) is strictly positive evaluated at x = q, b) is strictly negative
evaluated at x = xc, and c) crosses 0 exactly once.
First, note that Eq. 9 is the product of two terms, (1 ￿ F (￿ v (x;q))) and Z(x;q;xc), where
Z(x;q;xc) ￿ ￿H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿ [￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ x) + ￿ v (x;q)] + ￿0
c (xc ￿ x): (10)
Since (1 ￿ F (￿ v (x;q))) > 0 8x by full support of f (v), Equation 9 has the same sign as Z(x;q;xc);
so it su¢ ces to show properties a), b), and c) for the latter.
To show a), evaluating at x = q; Z(q;q;xc) = ￿0
c (xc ￿ q) > 0. To show b), evaluating
at x = xc and using the fact that ￿i (0) = ￿0
i (0) = 0, Z(xc;q;xc) = ￿f (￿ v (xc;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (xc)￿
[￿c (xc ￿ q) + ￿ v (xc;q)] < 0:
To show c) we show Z(x;q;xc) is strictly decreasing in x. Examining Eq. 10 term by term
it is straightforward to verify that the following observations imply this property: 1) ￿ v (x;q) is
strictly increasing in x and hence, because H (v) is assumed to be non-decreasing, H (￿ v (x;q)) is
non-decreasing in x, 2) ￿￿c (xc ￿ x) is strictly increasing in x, 3) ￿0
f (x) is strictly increasing in x
by convexity, and 4) ￿0
c (xc ￿ x) is strictly decreasing in x.
Finally, we show that ~ xcl (xc;q) is strictly increasing in q. First, observe that by the properties
previously shown, Z(x;q;xc) > 0 implies that ~ xcl (xc;q) > x. Thus, if we let q < q0 we can
show that the target policy is strictly increasing, i.e., ~ xcl (xc;q0) > ~ xcl (xc;q); by proving that
Z(~ xcl (xc;q);q;xc) = 0 implies that Z(~ xcl (xc;q);q0;xc) > 0: This holds because Z(x;q;xc) is
strictly increasing in q; which can be seen from Eq. 10 due to the fact that 1) ￿ v (x;q) is strictly
decreasing in q which implies H (￿ v (x;q)) is weakly decreasing in q, and 2) ￿c (xc ￿ q) is strictly
decreasing in q. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2 The initial choice of rule has no e⁄ect on the set of possible target policies,
the expected distribution of post-investment valence returns, or the set of feasible post-investment
31bill referrals. Hence, it su¢ ces to show that every post-investment bill referral by the committee
will result in the same ￿nal policy outcome when the ￿ oor behaves optimally in the ￿nal stage.
This implies that the ex-ante expected ￿ oor and committee payo⁄s for any investment decision and
choice of target policy will be identical between the two subgames.
Consider an arbitrary bill referral (^ v; ^ x). Under a closed rule with a status quo point (0;0),
the ￿ oor￿ s choice set is restricted to f(0;0);(^ v; ^ x)g, where (^ v; ^ x) is the committee￿ s bill referral and
may be di⁄erent from the target policy with realized valence (~ v; ~ x). Under an open rule, the ￿ oor
may select from the full set f(0;y); 8y 2 Rg[f(^ v; ^ x)g. However, the ￿ oor￿ s additional choices are
irrelevant because (0;0) dominates any (0;y). Hence for any bill referral (^ v; ^ x) the ￿ oor￿ s ￿nal stage
choice in either game is identical, demonstrating the result. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider ￿rst the closed rule. Associated with ~ xcl (xc;q) is a va-














= ￿ v (y;0). Recall ￿ v (y;0) is the valence cuto⁄ under an open rule when the
target policy is y (by Lemma 2). Henceforth, we denote ￿ v (y;0) as ￿ v (y) for simplicity. So y is the
ideological point between the ￿ oor and committee ideal points such that, were the committee to
select it as the target policy under an open rule, it would become the ￿nal policy outcome for the
same realizations of valence as ~ xcl (xc;q) does under a closed rule. It is easy to verify that y exists,
is unique, and is in the interval (0;xc).
Now suppose that under an open rule the committee invests and works on target policy y. The
utility from working on y must be weakly less than the utility of working on ~ xo (xc) (because the
latter is optimal), and combining this observation with Eq. 8, we have:
cnt









= ￿ v (y).
cnt
o (xc)￿cnt
cl (xc;q) ￿ (1 ￿ F (￿ v (y)))
￿
[￿c (xc) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ y)] ￿
h
￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c
￿
xc ￿ ~ xcl (xc;q)
￿i￿
:




￿c (xc) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ y) > ￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c
￿
xc ￿ ~ xcl (xc;q)
￿
: (11)
Eq. 11 follows from convexity of ￿f (￿) and ￿c (￿). We show this in two steps. First we argue that





￿ ￿f (q) = ￿ v (~ x(xc;q);q) = ￿ v (y) = ￿f (y) < ￿f (y + q) ￿ ￿f (q): (12)





￿f (y + q), implying y + q > ~ xcl (xc;q) since ￿f (￿) is strictly increasing. We now use the fact that
y > ~ xcl (xc;q) ￿ q to show the ￿nal result.
￿c (xc) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ y) > ￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ (y + q))
> ￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c
￿
xc ￿ ~ xcl (xc;q)
￿
:
The strict inequality in the ￿rst line follows from convexity of ￿c (￿). The strict inequality at the
start of the second line follows from the fact that y + q > ~ xcl (xc;q) and ￿c (￿) is increasing.￿
Proof of Proposition 4 If c > cnt
o (xc), the committee does not invest in valence under either






, the committee invests only
under an open rule. Under a closed rule the ￿ oor￿ s utility is ￿￿f (q) < 0. Under an open rule, the
￿ oor￿ s utility is at least as great as 0 ￿ ￿f (0) = 0 for any ~ v, so it strictly prefers an open rule.
Finally, consider c ￿ cnt
cl (xc;q), which implies the committee invests in valence under both rules.
33We must show that V nt
cl (q;xc) < V nt
o (xc).
V nt
cl (q;xc) = V
￿




0; ~ xcl (q;xc)
￿
by parts 1 and 4 of Lemma 3
< V
￿
0; ~ xcl (0;xc)
￿
= V nt
o (xc) by Lemma 1, and parts 1 and 3 of Lemma 3.￿
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0Supplemental Appendix for Referees
This appendix contains supplemental proofs for ￿Policy-Speci￿c Information and Informal Agenda
Power.￿If the manuscript is accepted this material will be posted online. The appendix is divided
into three sections. The ￿rst proves that our main substantive results hold if the valence of the
status quo is strictly greater than zero. The second provides a complete set of results for the
committee composition game; these results are used to generate the example in the main text. The
third analyzes a variant of our model in which valence is transferable by the committee but not
expropriable by the ￿ oor.
1Status Quo with Strictly Positive Valence
We show that if the status quo has strictly positive valence vq > 0 then our main substantive results
still hold.
Transferable valence If vq > 0 then this valence is transferable to any other policy, even absent
any committee e⁄ort. This is equivalent to a model in which we rede￿ne the committee￿ s valence
return probability distribution for v 2 [0;1) to be a di⁄erent distribution G(￿) on [0;1) such
that G(0) = F(vq); and for z > 0; G(z) = F(z + vq): Informally G(z) is the probability that the
di⁄erence between realized valence v and status quo valence vq is less than or equal to z. Using
G(￿) the model satis￿es all of our original assumptions, and our results go through substantively
unchanged.
Policy-speci￿c valence Suppose the status quo has policy-speci￿c valence vq > 0. There are
two possibilities. One is that the ￿ oor prefers (vq;q) over (0;0); in which case the closed rule and
open rule are equivalent, because even under an open rule (0;0) is not a relevant policy option.
The second possibility is that the ￿ oor prefers (0;0) over (vq;q). In this case, under an open rule
the committee￿ s investment decision is the same as in the policy-speci￿c model in the main paper.
Under a closed rule, the committee has less incentive to invest in valence acquisition than under an
open rule. The reason for this is two-fold. First, as shown in the main paper it has less incentive to
invest if the status quo is (0;q) than if the status quo is (0;0). Second, it has even less incentive to
invest if the status quo is (vq;q) than if it is (0;q). This is true because 1) the probability that the
valence return will be su¢ ciently high so that an arbitrary target policy ~ x defeats the status quo
is greater when the status quo is (0;q) than when it is (vq;q), and 2) if the policy ~ x were to pass
given either status quo the gain to the committee is greater if the status quo is (0;q) than if it is
2(vq;q).
The ￿nal step of the proof is to show that the target policy that the committee works on if the
status quo is (vq;q) is worse for ￿ oor than the target policy under an open rule.
Lemma 4 For any status quo (vq;q) that the ￿oor prefers to (0;0), the target policy is strictly
more extreme than the target policy under an open rule.
Proof. We begin by introducing additional notation. Let ~ x(vq;q) denote the optimal target policy
under a closed rule when the status quo is (vq;q). Note that this suppresses the dependence of ~ x
on the committee￿ s ideal point xc. Also, note that the target policy under an open rule is ~ x(0;0):
In addition, let ￿ v (~ x;vq;q) denote the valence cuto⁄ when the status quo is (vq;q), i.e.,
￿ v (~ x;vq;q) = ￿f (jxj) ￿ ￿f (jqj) + vq;
and note that ￿ v (~ x;vq;q) = vq + ￿ v (~ x;q).
The ￿rst step of the proof is to argue that ~ x(vq;q) 2 [q;xc]. Clearly ~ x > xc is dominated by
~ x = xc. Furthermore ~ x < q is dominated by ~ x = q. If the target policy is ~ x = q then the outcome
is (vq;q) for a realized valence v ￿ vq and (v;q) otherwise, and if the target policy is instead ~ x < q
then the outcome is (vq;q) for v ￿ ~ v (~ x;vq;q) < vq and (v; ~ x) for v 2 (~ v (~ x;vq;q);vq) and v ￿ vq.
The committee is therefore equally well o⁄or strictly worse o⁄with ~ x < q depending on the realized
valence.
The next step is to provide a characterization of ~ x(vq;q). The committee￿ s modi￿ed objective
function is easily derived by beginning with Eq. 5 in the main text and substituting in ￿ v (~ x;vq;q)
for ￿ v (~ x;q) and vq ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ q) for ￿￿c (xc ￿ q). It is straightforward to show that the derivative
w.r.t. ~ x is then the product of two terms (1 ￿ F (￿ v (~ x;vq;q))) > 0 and
￿H (￿ v (~ x;vq;q)) ￿ ￿
0
f (x) ￿ ((￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ x)) + ￿ v (x;q)) + ￿
0
c (xc ￿ x): (13)
3It is also easily veri￿ed that Eq. 13 is very similar to Eq. 10 in the proof of Lemma 1 and in
particular satis￿es all the properties of the latter used to prove the lemma. Hence Lemma 1 also
holds when vq > 0.
The ￿nal step is to argue that ~ x(vq;q) > ~ x(0;0). We do this by arguing that ~ x(vq;q) > ~ x(0; ^ q),
where ^ q is the unique status quo ^ q 2 (0;q) such that the ￿ oor is indi⁄erent between (0; ^ q) and
(vq;q), i.e., ￿￿f (^ q) = vq ￿ ￿f (q). Such a ^ q exists because the ￿ oor prefers (0;0) to (vq;q). The
desired property then follows immediately since ~ x(0; ^ q) > ~ x(0;0) by Proposition 2.
To show ~ x(vq;q) > ~ x(0; ^ q) we show Eq. 13 is strictly positive when evaluated at status quo
(vq;q) and proposal ~ x(0; ^ q), which means that, by reasoning similar to the reasoning for Lemma 1
in the main text, when the status quo is (vq;q) the committee is better o⁄ proposing a bill more
extreme than ~ x(0; ^ q). From Eq 13
￿H (￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q);vq;q)) ￿ ￿
0
f (~ x(0; ^ q)) ￿ ((￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ ~ x(0; ^ q))) + ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q);q))
+￿
0
c (xc ￿ ~ x(0; ^ q))
= 0 + H (￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q); ^ q)) ￿ ￿
0
f (~ x(0; ^ q)) ￿ [￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q); ^ q) ￿ ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q);q)] > 0:
The ￿rst equality holds by substituting the ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q);vq;q) term inside H (￿) with ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q); ^ q),
substituting the ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q);q) term with ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q); ^ q)￿(￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q); ^ q) ￿ ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q);q)), multiplying
out, and using the optimality of ~ x(0; ^ q) at status quo (0; ^ q) to cancel terms. The second inequality
follows immediately from H (￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q); ^ q)) ￿ ￿
0
f (~ x(0; ^ q)) > 0 and from the fact that ^ q < q implies
￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q); ^ q) > ￿ v (~ x(0; ^ q);q).￿
4Committee Composition
We consider a modi￿ed game sequence in which the ￿ oor ￿rst selects the committee￿ s ideal point
from a compact interval ￿ X.15 Proofs of the stated lemmas and propositions are deferred to the end
of this section because several accessory lemmas are required.
Without loss of generality we assume that xf = 0, ￿ X = [0; ￿ x] with ￿ x > 0, and q ￿ 0. As in the
baseline model it su¢ ces to consider only committee appointments to the right of the ￿ oor, since
only the distance between the committee and the ￿ oor jxf ￿ xcj determines the players￿equilibrium
payo⁄s.16 The upper bound ￿ x may be thought of as the distance between the most extreme possible
committee appointee and the chamber median.
Transferable Valence
First, recall the de￿nitions of q￿ and ￿ xc (q) from Proposition 1; ￿ xc (q) is the most extreme committee
for which the ￿ oor prefers a closed rule and specialization to an open rule absent specialization,
and ￿f (q￿) = E [v]. The following proposition then characterizes the ￿ oor￿ s optimal committee
appointments behavior.
Proposition 5 Suppose valence is transferable. The ￿oor￿ s choice of committee is as follows.
Case 1 (Low Cost Specialization): If c ￿ E [v], the ￿oor is indi⁄erent over all appointments,
chooses an open rule, and the committee specializes.
15We analyze choice from a compact interval rather than a ￿nite set of possible committee appointees for simplicity;
results in the latter case are qualitatively similar.
16When xc < 0 and q > 0, the equilibrium payo⁄s of the committee and the ￿ oor in each possible subgame (closed
or open rule) and for each possible valence type (transferable or nontransferable) are identical to those in which the
committee￿ s ideal point is ￿xc > 0. The only distinction in equilibrium is that realized spatial policy outcomes are
re￿ ected about the ￿ oor￿ s ideal point.
5Case 2 (Costly Specialization, Extreme Status Quo): If c > E [v] and q ￿ q￿, the ￿oor
is indi⁄erent over appointments, chooses an open rule, and the committee does not specialize.
Case 3 (Costly Specialization, Moderate Status Quo): If c > E [v] and q < q￿, the ￿oor
strictly prefers to appoint a preference outlier x￿




cl (￿ xc (q);q)
￿
: Otherwise the ￿oor is indi⁄erent over appointments, chooses an open
rule, and the committee does not specialize.
The proposition may be interpreted as follows. Suppose that c > E [v], so the value of valence
alone is insu¢ cient to induce specialization. Then the ￿ oor may attempt to appoint a preference
outlier x￿
c (q;c) > q and consider its legislation under a closed rule in order to induce specialization.
Committees who are preference outliers have a relatively greater incentive to specialize under a
closed rule because they bene￿t more from informal agenda power.
The ￿ oor will not attempt this strategy if the status quo point is too extreme, i.e. q > q￿, because
its ideological losses from a closed rule would be too great. However, if q is relatively moderate then
for intermediate levels of cost c 2 (E [v];ct
cl (￿ xc (q);q)] there exist preference outliers x￿
c (q;c) > q
who can be induced to specialize by being granted a closed rule, and are su¢ ciently moderate that
the ￿ oor is willing to do so. The ￿ oor￿ s choice of which preference outlier to appoint when pursuing
this approach is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Whenever the ￿oor selects a closed rule in equilibrium, it appoints the most moderate
committee willing to specialize, i.e., the unique x￿
c (q;c) satisfying ct
cl (x￿
c (q;c);q) = c: The optimal
committee choice satis￿es the following comparative statics.
1. Consider two possible specialization costs for c0 > c. If a closed rule would be chosen given
either cost, then the higher cost results in a more extreme appointee, i.e. x￿
c (q;c0) > x￿
c (q;c):
2. Consider two possible status quos q0 > q. If a closed rule would be chosen given either status




Whenever the ￿ oor intends to use a restrictive rule to induce specialization, it appoints a com-
mittee no more extreme than necessary to induce specialization. This results in a straightforward
appointments dynamic. Because the committee￿ s value for specialization is decreasing in both its
formal agenda power (i.e. having an extreme q) and in the cost of specialization, increasing q and
c results in more extreme appointees being necessary to induce specialization.
Another feature to note is that the range of costs
￿
E [v];ct
cl (￿ xc (q);q)
￿
for which the ￿ oor
appoints a preference outlier and grants a closed rule shrinks as the status quo q becomes more
extreme. The reason is that this strategy becomes less e⁄ective at inducing specialization as q
increases. When q ￿ q￿, the ￿ oor ceases appointing outliers and simply selects an open rule.
Policy-Speci￿c Valence
We now analyze the ￿ oor￿ s optimal committee appointment in the case of policy-speci￿c valence.
Recall that policy-speci￿c valence is inherently protected from expropriation regardless of the rule,
and that open rules are therefore superior for inducing specialization. As in the case of transferable
valence, preference outliers value specialization more, and hence the ￿ oor may need to appoint
preference outliers to induce specialization. However, because open rules are always chosen in
equilibrium, appointing outliers is much less costly: the ￿ oor always retains the right to discard the
valence generated in committee and amend the target policy to its own ideal point. This generates
the following appointments behavior.
Proposition 6 If valence is policy-speci￿c, the ￿oor￿ s choice of committee is as follows.
Case 1 (Low Cost Specialization): If c ￿ E [v], all appointees will specialize and an optimal
appointment is a centrist x￿
c (c) = 0.
7Case 2 (Prohibitively Costly Specialization): If c > cnt
o (￿ x), no appointee is willing to
specialize and the ￿oor is indi⁄erent over appointees.
Case 3 (Costly Specialization): If c 2 (E [v];cnt
o (￿ x)], every optimal appointee is a prefer-
ence outlier, i.e. x￿
c (c) > 0, and the selected appointee specializes.
In the previously-analyzed transferable valence game, the ￿ oor had an incentive to appoint
preference outliers to induce specialization, but this incentive was tempered by the need to relinquish
amendment power via a closed rule. In contrast, with policy-speci￿c valence the incentive to appoint
outliers is unrestrained. The ￿ oor optimally induces specialization precisely by maintaining formal
amendment power, and thus if a centrist committee xc = 0 would not specialize then the ￿ oor is
better o⁄ appointing any preference outlier, however extreme, that would be willing to specialize.
The ￿ oor￿ s optimal committee appointment when it selects a preference outlier is characterized
in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Whenever the ￿oor selects a preference outlier x￿
c (c) > 0, it appoints a committee
working on the most moderate target policy ~ xo (xc) from among the set willing to specialize, i.e.,
x￿
c (c) 2 argmin
fxc:cnt
o (xc;q)￿cg
f~ xo (xc)g The optimal appointee satis￿es the following comparative statics.
1. If x￿
c (c) is an optimal appointee at cost c but not at cost c0 > c, then every optimal appointee
for c0 is strictly more extreme, i.e. x￿
c (c0) > x￿
c (c).
2. If the derivative of committee￿ s spatial loss function ￿c (d) is concave, i.e. ￿000
c (d) ￿ 0, then
the optimal appointee x￿
c (c) is unique, strictly increasing in c, and satis￿es cnt
o (x￿
c (c)) = c:
In the non-transferable valence game, the committee￿ s preferences in￿ uence the ￿ oor￿ s utility
only through the committee￿ s choice of the target policy ~ xo (xc). Although the ￿ oor never accepts
a policy worse than its own ideal point absent valence, it is better o⁄ in expectation when the
8committee works on a more moderate target policy. Thus, the lemma states that the ￿ oor always
chooses an outlier to induce specialization if one who will do so exists, but then chooses the outlier
who would work on the most moderate target policy. This results in the set of optimal appointments
being weakly increasing in the cost of specialization.17 Finally, the lemma states that for a special
case of the committee￿ s loss function (including quadratic loss), the optimal appointee is simply
the most moderate one that would be willing to specialize.
Committee Composition Accessory Lemmas
Lemma 7 The closed rule cost cutpoints ct
cl (xc;q) and cnt
cl (xc;q) are continuous and satisfy,
1. ct
cl (xc;q) = cnt
cl (xc;q) = E [v] for xc ￿ q
2. ct
cl (xc;q) and cnt
cl (xc;q) are strictly increasing in xc for xc > q.
Proof. Transferable Valence: Continuity and part 1 of the lemma are easily established from
the de￿nition in Eq. (3). To see strictly increasing, suppose x0
c > xc ￿ q. If committee with
ideal point x0
c specialized, it could follow the optimal proposal strategy of a committee with ideal
point xc and receive ex-ante expected utility E [v]￿
R ￿ v(xc;q)
0 ￿c (x0
c ￿ ￿ x(v;q))f (v)dv. Hence its cost
cutpoint ct





c ￿ q) ￿ ￿c(x0





(￿c(xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;q))f(v)dv + (1 ￿ F(￿ v(xc;q)))￿c(xc ￿ q)
= ct
cl (xc;q), where the inequality follows from the strict convexity of ￿c (￿).
17This is meant in a set-order sense, i.e., S (c) increasing in c i.f.f. for c
0 > c, x
0 2 S (c
0) and x 2 S (c) and x
0 < x
! x 2 S (c
0) and x
0 2 S (c).
9Non-transferable valence: Continuity and part 1 of the lemma are easily established from the de-
￿nition in Eq. (6). To show (2), suppose x0
c > xc ￿ q. It is straightforward to verify that if
a committee with ideal point x0
c specialized and selected target policy ~ xcl (xc;q) it would receive
strictly greater change in utility than a committee with ideal point xc. This su¢ ces to show the
property. ￿
Lemma 8 If the committee￿ s loss function ￿c (￿) is convex and its derivative ￿0
c (￿) is weakly con-
cave, then ~ xcl (xc;q) is strictly increasing in xc.
Proof. From Eq. 9 and Lemma 1, ~ xcl (xc;q) is characterized by the ￿rst order condition,
(1 ￿ F (￿ v (x;q)))
￿
￿H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿ (￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ x) + ￿ v (x;q)) + ￿
0
c (xc ￿ x)
￿
= 0:
To show that ~ xcl (xc;q) is strictly increasing in xc, it su¢ ces to show that the derivative of the term
in parentheses w.r.t. xc is strictly positive when evaluated at ~ xcl (xc;q) 2 (q;xc). This implies that
the cross partial in x and xc of the original objective function is strictly positive when evaluated at
the optimum, which generates the desired result.
First, it is straightforward to show that ￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ x) can be rewritten as,
￿c (xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c (xc ￿ x) = ￿(x;xc;q) + (x ￿ q) ￿ ￿0







c (xc ￿ x + y) ￿ ￿0
c (xc ￿ x)
￿
dy:
Clearly ￿(x;xc;q) > 0 since ￿0
c (￿) is an increasing function by the strict convexity of ￿c (￿).
Now substitute this into the term in parentheses, which generates,
￿H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿
￿
￿(x;xc;q) + (x ￿ q) ￿ ￿0




c (xc ￿ x)
=
￿
1 ￿ H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0




c (xc ￿ x) ￿ H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿ (￿(x;xc;q) + ￿ v (x;q))
10At the optimum ~ xcl (xc;q), the above expression must equal to 0. Since H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿
(￿(x;xc;q) + ￿ v (x;q)) > 0 and ￿
0
c (xc ￿ x) > 0 for all (x;xc;q), at the optimum it must also be the
case that
1 ￿ H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿ (x ￿ q)
￿
￿
x=~ xcl(xc;q) > 0
since otherwise the expression would be less than 0.
Now take the derivative of the rewritten ￿rst order condition with respect to xc and evaluate
at the optimum, which generates,
￿
1 ￿ H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿ (x ￿ q)
￿
￿00









We show that Eq. 14 is strictly positive. Because 1 ￿ H (￿ v (x;q)) ￿ ￿0
f (x) ￿ (x ￿ q)
￿ ￿
x=~ xcl(xc;q) > 0
as shown above and ￿00
c (xc ￿ x) > 0 by convexity, a su¢ cient condition for Eq. 14 to be strictly
positive is that @










c (xc ￿ x + y) ￿ ￿0










c (xc ￿ x + y) ￿ ￿
00
c (xc ￿ x)
￿
dy:
Thus a su¢ cient condition for @
@ xc (￿(x;xc;q)) ￿ 0 is that ￿
00
c (￿) is weakly decreasing, which is
equivalent to ￿0
c (￿) being weakly concave. This completes the proof, and the condition clearly holds
for a quadratic loss function ￿c (d) = ￿ ￿ d2, because ￿00
c (d) = 2￿.￿
Main Committee Composition Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5. Case 1: Suppose c ￿ E [v] = ct
o (xc) 8xc 2 ￿ X. Then any appointee
would invest under either rule, the ￿ oor selects an open rule for all committees, and its utility from
any appointment is E [v]. Hence it is indi⁄erent over all appointments.
11Cases 2 and 3: It is assumed throughout this section that c > E [v]. This implies three
things: (i) no committee specializes under an open rule, (ii) the ￿ oor￿ s utility from appointing any
committee and choosing an open rule is identical and equal to 0, and (iii) the ￿ oor strictly prefers
to appoint any committee for whom it selects a closed rule to any committee for whom it selects
an open rule.
To prove case 2, suppose q ￿ q￿. Then by Proposition 1 the ￿ oor selects an open rule for all
committees, no committee specializes, and the ￿ oor is therefore indi⁄erent over appointments.
To prove case 3, suppose q < q￿. Then by Proposition 1 the set of committees for whom the ￿ oor
strictly prefers a closed rule and specialization to an open rule and no specialization is nonempty




xc 2 ￿ X : ct
cl (xc;q) ￿ c
￿
:
Now consider the case where c 2
￿
E [v];ct
cl (￿ xc (q);q)
￿
. Then S (c) is nonempty and equal to
[x￿
c (q;c); ￿ x], where x￿
c (q;c) is uniquely de￿ned by ct
cl (x￿
c (q;c);q) = c. In addition, x￿
c (q;c) 2
(q; ￿ xc (q)). These properties follow immediately from c > E [v], ct
cl (q;q) = E [v], and ct
cl (xc;q)
strictly increasing in xc over xc ￿ q as shown in Lemma 7. By Proposition 1, the set of committees
for whom the ￿ oor selects a closed rule is [0; ￿ xc (q)) \ [x￿
c (q;c); ￿ x], which is non-empty and equal
to [x￿
c (q;c); ￿ xc (q)]. The optimal appointee therefore comes from this set. Finally, the optimal
appointee must be the set￿ s most moderate member x￿
c (q;c), since the ￿ oor￿ s utility with a closed
rule and specialization is strictly decreasing in the committee￿ s ideal point by Lemma 3.
Finally, consider the case where c > ct
cl (￿ xc (q);q). If S (c) is empty then we are done, since no
committee would specialize under a closed rule. If S (c) is nonempty then the set of committees
for whom the ￿ oor selects a closed rule is [0; ￿ xc (q)) \ [x￿
c (q;c); ￿ x] = ;, since c > ct
cl (￿ xc (q);q) and
S (c) non-empty imply ￿ xc (q) < x￿
c (q;c).￿
12Proof of Lemma 5. The proof of the characterization is contained in the proof of Proposition
5. To prove the ￿rst comparative static, if a closed rule is selected for both c and c0, then we must
have x￿
c (q;c0) > x￿
c (q;c) since ct
cl (xc;q) is strictly increasing in xc for xc > x￿
c (q;c) > q.






















cl (xc;q) is strictly decreasing in q when q 2 [0;xc] and q < q0 < x￿
c (q0;c). This then implies
that the x￿
c (q;c) satisfying ct
cl (x￿
c (q;c);q) = c must be strictly less than x￿
c (q0;c), since ct
cl (xc;q)
is strictly increasing in xc over xc > x￿
c (q0;c) > q0 > q and therefore strictly greater than c for all
xc ￿ x￿
c (q0;c).￿
Proof of Proposition 6. Case 1: When c ￿ E [v], every appointee would specialize since
cnt
o (0) = E [v] and cnt
o (xc) is strictly increasing in xc. The target policy chosen by a centrist is
~ xo (0) = 0, so this must be an optimal appointment.
Cases 2 and 3: Suppose c > E [v]. Recall that by Proposition 3 an open rule is selected for all
parameters. Thus the ￿ oor￿ s utility from no specialization is 0, and its utility from specialization
when the target policy is ~ x is V nt
o (~ x) = V (0; ~ x) =
R 1
￿ v(~ x;0) (v ￿ ￿f (~ x))f (v)dv > 0. Thus regardless
of the target policy the ￿ oor strictly prefers specialization to no specialization, because under an
open rule the ￿ oor need only accept the committee￿ s bill for realizations of valence that make it
strictly better o⁄ than its own ideal point with no valence.
The set of committees who specialize is,
S (c) =
￿
xc 2 ￿ X : cnt
o (xc) ￿ c
￿
Note that c > E [v], cnt
o (0) = E [v], and cnt
o (0) is strictly increasing in xc. These together imply
that S (c) is non-empty if and only if c ￿ cnt
o (￿ x), and that if S (c) is non-empty then it is equal
to [^ xc (c); ￿ x], where ^ xc (c) > 0 is the unique committee ideal point indi⁄erent between investing
13and not investing, i.e. cnt
o (^ xc (c)) = c. Since cnt
o (xc) = cnt
cl (xc;0), by Lemma 7 cnt
o (xc) is strictly






If S (c) is empty then the ￿ oor is indi⁄erent over all appointments. If S (c) is non-empty then any
optimal appointment must be a member of S (c), because the ￿ oor strictly prefers any committee
who specializes to one who does not. Finally, by Lemma 3 when the committee specializes the
￿ oor￿ s utility is V (0; ~ xo (xc)). Since V (￿) is strictly decreasing in its second argument (the target
policy), if S (c) is nonempty then the set of optimal appointments is,
X￿
nt (c) = arg min
xc2[^ xc(c);￿ x]
f~ xo (xc)g
or the specializing committee (or committees) that choose the most moderate target policy.
We now complete the proof. For case 2, c > cnt
o (￿ x) ! S (c) = ;. For case 3, if c 2 (E [v];cnt
o (￿ x)]
then S (c) is nonempty. Every optimal appointment must come from S (c) = [^ xc (c); ￿ x] when it is
nonempty. ￿
Proof of Lemma 6. The characterization is simply a restatement of the characterization in
the proof of Proposition 6. We now prove the two comparative statics.
Part 1: If x￿
c (c) is an optimal appointment given c, then the appointee chooses the most
moderate target policy among the set of specializers, i.e. ~ xo (x￿
c (c)) ￿ ~ xo (xc) 8xc 2 S (c). Since
S (c0) ￿ S (c), x￿
c (c) also chooses the most moderate target policy among S (c0). Then x￿
c (c) not
optimal for c0 implies S (c0) 6= ; (since then all appointments are optimal) and x￿
c (c) 62 S (c0).
Hence x￿
c (c) < S (c0). Since every optimal appointment comes from S (c0) when it is non-empty,
this completes the proof.
Part 2: If ￿c (d) has a concave derivative then ~ xo (xc) is strictly increasing in xc by Lemma 8.
Hence argminxc2[^ xc(c);￿ x] f~ xo (xc)g = ^ xc (c).￿
14Committee-Transferable Valence
We will use the term committee-transferable valence to refer to valence that is transferable by
the committee but not expropriable by the ￿ oor. With a closed rule and committee-transferable
valence, the model functions exactly like the closed rule model with transferable valence in the
main text of our paper. With an open rule and committee-transferable valence, the model can be
treated as a special case of the closed rule transferable valence game, with q = 0:
We show that the committee￿ s gain from investment in valence is strictly higher under an open
rule than under a closed rule, and that conditional on the committee investing the ￿ oor is strictly
better o⁄ under an open rule. Thus, as in the case of policy-speci￿c valence, the ￿ oor always
chooses an open rule.
Committee investment With a closed rule, the committee￿ s gain from investment, from Eq. 3




(￿c(xc ￿ q) ￿ ￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;q))f(v)dv + (1 ￿ F(￿ v(xc;q)))￿c(xc ￿ q):
Because ￿ v(xc;0) > ￿ v(xc;q), i.e., it takes more valence to get the ￿ oor to go along with a bill at xc












With an open rule, the committee￿ s gain from investment is characterized by substituting in q = 0




(￿c(xc) ￿ ￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;0))f(v)dv + (1 ￿ F(￿ v(xc;0)))￿c(xc):












To compare the committee￿ s incentives under the two rules, we compare Eqs. 15 and 16 term by
term, noting that the ￿rst term is identical and each of the subsequent terms is strictly greater
for the open rule. For the second term, note that by strict concavity of the ￿ oor￿ s utility function
￿ x(v;q) ￿ q < ￿ x(v;0) ￿ 0 so by strict concavity of the committee￿ s utility function, ￿c(xc ￿ q) ￿
￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;q)) < ￿c(xc) ￿ ￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;0)); and thus the second term is strictly greater in Eq. 16
than in Eq. 15. A similar argument applies to the third term. By strict concavity of the ￿ oor￿ s
utility function we again have ￿ x(v;q) ￿ q < ￿ x(v;0) ￿ 0 but since v > ￿ v(xc;q) the committee now
refers xc < ￿ x(v;q); hence xc ￿ q < ￿ x(v;q) ￿ q < ￿ x(v;0) ￿ 0. Again applying strict concavity of
the committee￿ s utility function, ￿c(xc ￿ q) < ￿c(xc) ￿ ￿c(xc ￿ ￿ x(v;0)): Finally, the fourth term is
strictly greater in Eq. 16 because the committee￿ s loss function is strictly increasing and 0 < q < xc.
Floor utility We now show that if the committee invests in valence, the ￿ oor has a strictly higher
expected utility under the open rule. To do this we show that for any realized valence the ￿ oor
is at least as well o⁄ and for some realizations it is strictly better o⁄ under the open rule. For
v 2 [0; ￿ v(xc;q)]; the committee proposes a bill that leaves the ￿ oor indi⁄erent between the bill and
either the status quo (0;q) in the case of a closed rule or (0;0) in the case of an open rule. Because
the ￿ oor prefers (0;0) over (0;q) it is better o⁄ under the open rule. For v 2 [￿ v(xc;q); ￿ v(xc;0)]; the
committee proposes (v;xc) under a closed rule or (v; ￿ x(v;0)) under an open rule. Since ￿ x(v;0) < xc
the ￿ oor strictly prefers the open rule. For v > ￿ v(xc;0) the rule choice has no e⁄ect on the ￿ oor￿ s
utility because the committee proposes (v;xc) under either rule.
16